Sign up with your email address to be the first to know about new products, VIP offers, blog features & more.

Florida AG Bondi Turns Blind Eye on Possible $190 Million Fraud on FRS Pension Plan

In September 2013, I wrote a letter (see below), a factual brief from admissions and the record, and over 6,000 pdf documents (collectively Documents) to Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi and others1 to alert her for investigation misleading statements, omissions of material information, and long-term concealment of facts by Liberty Partners, an investment advisor, fiduciary, and attorney-in-fact of the Florida State Board of Administration’s Alternative Investment Group2, and recovery of The Florida’s Retirement System Pension Fund $190 million loss on its investment in Regulus Group LLC. Neither Attorney General Bondi or any Florida officials ever responded to me to discuss this matter.

In 2011, Sydney P. Freedberg of the Tampa Bay Times best described why it takes so long for someone to know the value and other matters regarding the Private Placements in Alternative Investments.3 I believe Florida’s lack of investigation into this matter is a breach of its duty to its pensioners.

_________________________________________________________________

David Barnes Still ׀ Founder, Regulus Group LLC ׀o562 Huron Avenue ׀ Cambridge, MA 02138  617.417.3192

September 1, 2013

The Honorable Pamela Bondi
Attorney General, State of Florida
The Capitol, PL-01
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

Subject: Opportunity to recover Florida’s $162 million loss4 on its investment in Regulus Group LLC plus the $28 million of fees5, that Liberty Partners, a New York private equity investment firm, collected from the SBA to produce the loss

Dear Attorney General Bondi,

I am writing to you today to call your attention to a matter of exceptional importance to you and to the citizens of Florida.

As the following letter and addendum outline,6 I believe without reservation that the SBA’s $162 million loss on its investment in Regulus Group LLC (Regulus or Company) by New York-based private equity firm Liberty Partners LLP (Liberty) was largely caused by Liberty’s misleading statements, omissions of material information, and long-term concealment of facts.

The relevant time period of the misleading statements and omissions of material information was late 1999 through 2001 when the SBA’s investment in Regulus increased from $997 to $227 million8, close to its highest investment level .

The conclusive proof of Liberty’s misleading statements, omissions of material information, and concealment was first produced in late 2008 by Merrill Lynch (Merrill) in a malpractice action. My legal actions against Liberty were then over. In 2010, a Florida newspaper reported that sources described Regulus as a “winner” and “net return after fees on [these] companies is not known, but SBA documents describe them as profitable.9 Then, in 2012, the SBA produced documents to me that disclosed for the first time that the SBA suffered $162 million in damages from its investment in Regulus.

I would not be able to write this letter and addendum without the documents first disclosed by Merrill in 2008 and the SBA in 2012. Were it not for those documents, Liberty’s misrepresentations, omissions, and concealment would not have been detected.

Based on my analysis, I see little to no way the SBA could have or should have, known until now the effect on its investment in Regulus from the matters discussed in this letter and addendum.

Liberty is a New York-based private equity firm, investment advisor, fiduciary, and attorney-in-fact of the SBA’s Alternative Investment Group. It is obligated to behave in accordance with ERISA.10 Liberty invests in companies in the more advanced stage of development on behalf of the SBA11 in contrast to venture capital that is involved in ideas and startups. Liberty was able to invest in debt and equity12,13 of a company.  It earned fees on an investment-by-investment, not portfolio returns, basis.14

Liberty invested in Regulus from 1996 through 2008.15,16 Regulus was Liberty’s first investment in a start-up.17 and Regulus was Liberty’s first investment in a company with a leverage buildup strategy.18 It was publicly reported that in 2008 Liberty sold Regulus for a $100 million.19 In June 2009, Liberty sent the SBA its last payment from the sale.20

I founded Regulus in 1995. In 1996, I obtained a financial commitment from Liberty. In 1997, I launched Regulus’ business.21 In 2000, I voluntarily withdrew from the activities of Regulus22 and voluntarily resigned my title of Chairman23 in protest to actions by Liberty. While at Regulus, unsuccessfully, I asked Liberty and Regulus to remedy prima facie problems to protect the SBA’s and our investment.24 I was convinced that Liberty’s and Regulus’ actions would cause customers to leave Regulus and destroy Regulus’ value. I was correct. I also believed and advised Liberty that Regulus possibly committed fraud against national banks and the SBA.25,26,27 Liberty then terminated me in August 2000 and in January 2001 took possession of my shares.

In 2000, the year I left the Company, Regulus reported $197 million in revenue and 2,900 employees. It advertised itself to be the nation’s largest independent billing and remittance company and one of the largest providers of document outsourcing solutions in the U.S. In 2001, Liberty valued Regulus at $470 million with an equity value of $208 million.28 A year later, Liberty advised the SBA that Merrill valued Regulus in the range $419 to $651 million29 and it valued Regulus at $470 million.30,31

In September 2000, after I left Regulus as an employee, Liberty asked the SBA to amend the investment management agreement to permit Liberty to increase its maximum investment in any one portfolio company from $150 to $250 million. (2000 Amendment) On September 21, 2000, the SBA signed the 2000 Amendment.32

At the time, Liberty did not provide the SBA with material information. First, it did not disclose Regulus’ actual audited financial results for 1997, 1998, and 1999 fiscal years. As background, in September 1999, Liberty and Regulus collaborated not to issue Regulus’ 1998 audited financial statements because auditor Arthur Andersen planned to issue going concern audit opinions. They made the same decision for the 1999 audited financial statements. In general, a going concern audit opinion means that the auditors believe there is substantial doubt as to an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. On the day of the signing of the 2000 amendment, Liberty, and Regulus knew that Regulus had accumulated net losses in 1997, 1998, and 1999 of $45 million even though it had withheld issuing the audited financial statements, which were months overdue causing defaults in agreements. (financial audit default) Liberty’s omission of this information was critical to the SBA for other reasons.

First, Regulus’ un-remedied violations placed it in default of agreements with the SBA, Wells Fargo, and management. The financial audit default triggered a “wind-down” covenant in the Wells Fargo agreement. Contractually, a “wind-down” covenant gave Wells Fargo the right to withdraw its business from Regulus. At the time, Regulus projected that Wells Fargo’s business would represent fifty-two percent of its 2001 revenue. For over a year, Liberty invested millions of the SBA’s money while Regulus was knowingly taking the default risk of losing over half of its business. Liberty did not disclose this to the SBA.

Second, nine days after Liberty signed the 2000 amendment, Liberty and Regulus first issued Regulus’ 1998 and 1999 audited financial statements, too late to impact the SBA’s decision on the 2000 amendment. Again, Liberty still did not disclose Regulus’ 1997 through 1999 net losses of $45 million. In December 2000, the SBA invested $68 million in Regulus. Liberty knew at the time but did not disclose to the SBA before it invested $68 million that Regulus’ first four years of cumulative losses through 2001 were approximately $75 million.33 In 2001, Regulus lost $25 million.34

Third, in 2000 when Regulus was in default of covenants and facing a going concern audit opinion, Regulus signed agreements with The Bank of America and Wells Fargo and invested the SBA’s money. Against my expressed demands, Regulus did not disclose its financial audit default and other un-remedied violations and defaulted to those banks. My comments are recorded in board minutes. I also refused to sign an agreement with The Bank of America because of what I believed to be inadequate disclosures, among other problems.35 At the time, I admonished Liberty, Regulus, and counsel that I believed Regulus could possibly be committing fraud against national banks and the SBA.36,37,38,39 Liberty and Regulus testified that from January 2000 through August 2000 Regulus did not provide me with all of the information that I requested, including my demands pursuant to the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act.

One month after Liberty signed the 2000 amendment it wrote the SBA stating if Regulus made an $85 million acquisition in December 2000, then Regulus would produce run rate revenue in December 2001 of $400 million [Emphasis $400 million]. Relying on Liberty’s $400 million pre-investment projection, two months later in December 2000, the SBA invested $68 million in Regulus.

Before the acquisition and through at least 2007, Liberty told the SBA that Regulus was going to, and did, make the acquisition. In truth, Regulus did not make the acquisition. Liberty created a new, unconsolidated company called Regulus Integrated Solutions (RIS) that made the acquisition. In response to my public record requests, the SBA did not produce any documents on RIS.

The documents produced by Merrill in 2008 first proved that Liberty knew before the SBA invested $68 million in Regulus that its $400 million pre-investment projection was misleading and simply untrue. Merrill’s 2008 documents contained several forecasts prepared by Liberty, Regulus, and Merrill in 2001 and 2002. None of those forecasts predicted $400 million of revenue until 2006 or later – not 2001 as Liberty had communicated to the SBA. The undisclosed forecasts supported previously produced misleading financial information that proved Liberty knew Regulus would not produce $400 million in run-rate revenue in December 2001.40

Over the six years after the SBA’s $68 million investment, 2001 through 2006, Regulus’ actual revenue was less than Liberty’s $400 million pre-investment projection. In fact, the revenue ranged from $203 to $265 million less than $400 million.

By December 2001 the SBA’s investment had reached $227 million. In the fiscal year 2000, Regulus incurred a net loss of $25 million. Liberty did not disclose to the SBA Regulus’ four years of cumulative net losses of $75 million.

By the end of 2001 when the SBA’s investment in Regulus was $227 million, Liberty had not disclosed any of Merrill’s forecasts created in 2001 and 2002 that proved that Liberty’s $400 million pre-investment projection was higher than reasonable. [Emphasis]

By the end of 2001, Liberty had not produced any enterprise valuations of Regulus to the SBA. After the SBA invested $68 million in Regulus in December 2000, Liberty testified to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (U.S. District Court) under oath and threat of perjury that effective June 2000, six months before the SBA’s $68 million investment, Regulus’ fair value was minus $121 million and its equity value was minus $257 million. [Emphasis minus] Liberty never disclosed these negative valuations to the SBA when it obtained the $250 million investment limit, or the SBA invested $68 million.

Six months later, in June 2001, Liberty told the SBA that Regulus’ enterprise value was $470 million42

Eighteen months later, in June 2002, Liberty told the SBA that Merrill calculated Regulus’ enterprise value to be between $419 and $651 million.43 In the same report, Liberty stated Regulus’ value was $470 million.Liberty’s founder Peter Bennett testified he did not see the Merrill valuation of $419 to $651 million that he sent to the SBA and did not know if anyone in his office had a copy. He was the head of Liberty’s Regulus investment team.

In 2008, Merrill produced several valuations of Regulus that Liberty, Regulus, and Merrill completed in 2001 and 2002. Not one of the valuations placed a minus valuation on Regulus, much less the minus $121 and $257 million values Liberty had testified to the U.S. District Court. However, the range of enterprise values of Regulus that Liberty communicated to others in 2001 and 2002 was minus $121 million to $1.1 billion.

The 2008 documents also proved that Merrill’s discounted cash flow valuation (DCF) of Regulus sent to the SBA that calculated the Company’s value in the range of $419 to $651 million. The valuation was derived by discounting an undisclosed misleading September 2001 forecast. Over the five years after the September 2001 forecast, Regulus’ actual revenue was less than the forecast from minus $27 to minus $295 million. This outcome debunked Liberty, Regulus, and Merrill’s misleading September 2001 forecast. As a result, thereby Merrill overstated the valuation of Regulus that Liberty sent to the SBA. After the U.S. District Court trial, Regulus hired the Merrill executive who prepared the Merrill $419 and $651 million valuations and acted as its valuation expert as an unpaid, unemployed individual.

In 2000, Regulus’ two most senior African American executive owners filed notices of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Bennett, Regulus’ chief executive officer Richard Long, Liberty, and Regulus. Regulus could not afford diversity issues because of its diverse employee base and diverse customer profiles. Liberty terminated the two African Americans. Liberty did not disclose Regulus’ racial discrimination issues and associated business risks to the SBA.

Almost immediately after Regulus opened its doors for business in January 1997, Liberty defaulted, and it did not remedy the covenant in the Regulus operating agreement that established managements’ ownership arrangement. Bennett testified Regulus’ class B members (management) owned twenty percent (20%) of Regulus. In fact, it was up to thirty percent (30%) based on achieving performance targets. Liberty’s default of the management ownership arrangement reduced the percentage that I contracted for in 1996 from up to thirty percent (30%) to eleven percent (11%). Liberty never disclosed to the SBA this unremedied default or impact it may have had on Regulus’ founding management who owned class C and D shares.

The individual partners of Liberty were entitled to personally invest up to fifteen percent of the SBA’s ownership interests aka common equity. Bennett testified that at one-point Regulus had $11 million of common equity. On that date, Liberty leveraged Regulus capitalization with $222 million of interest-paying debt and dividend-paying preferred interests. The capitalization produced funded debt to capitalization of ninety-five percent (95%), a far cry from the investment grade capitalization that Mr. Still asked for from Liberty in November 1998. The individual partners of Liberty did not invest in Preferred Interests even though Arthur Andersen classified those securities as equity. Liberty calculated and collected fees it received from the SBA based on a formula in the investment management agreement.

As a result of highly leveraging Regulus’ capitalization, Liberty collected millions of dollars in fees from the SBA. From inception through some date in 2006, Liberty calculated and collected $28 million in fees on the Regulus investment alone.44 Anyway one calculates the final numbers, net of fees and proceeds from the sale of Regulus, Liberty had $0 cash invested in Regulus. The SBA reported that’s its IRR on the Regulus investment was minus twenty-three and one-half percent (23.47%).45 Liberty’ return on the cash it invested and received from fees and proceeds from the sale of Regulus was infinite because at the end Liberty had no net cash in Regulus.46

Currently, Michael Stakias (Stakias) is Liberty’s president and chief executive officer, and non-executive chairman of Edison Schools. From 1984 to 1998, he worked for the Philadelphia law firm Blank Rome. In 1992, while a lawyer at Blank Rome, he represented Bennett personally in negotiating and raising funds for Liberty’s deal with the Florida State Pension Fund [SBA]. Unknown to me, in 1992, he and Bennett had an arrangement at a time when Stakias would later likely join Liberty. While at Blank Rome, without an engagement letter, Stakias assisted me in starting Regulus, introduced me to Liberty, became a friend, and gained an intimate knowledge of my financial affairs. He represented Bennett personally and, under the engagement letter, Liberty, Regulus and its affiliate and I believed he also represented me. In 1998, Stakias left Blank Rome and joined Liberty where he became a managing director, partner, president, and chief executive officer. Liberty did not disclose to the SBA about Stakias’ multiple, active involvement in the business, often conflicting roles at Regulus and their possible impact on the Company’s management.

From the month before Stakias joined Liberty to the month, Liberty sold Regulus, the SBA’s investment in Regulus increased from $26 to over $232 million.

I am unable to afford counsel.47 Respectfully, I request that Florida cancel my settlement agreement with Regulus et al. and provide me legal protection. I respectfully request whatever financial benefits accrue to a person who communicates these facts to Florida. It is most important to me to have the record corrected so that I can get work.

After reading that Regulus was a winner, I tried unsuccessfully in 2011, to persuade Bennett to voluntarily compensate me based on the irrefutable fact that admissions and record proved my actions at the time were fully supportive of the SBA, citizens of Florida, Liberty, other investors, and myself.

I encourage you to investigate this matter on behalf of the citizens of Florida whom you know need protection, particularly in this economic climate of high unemployment and reducing wealth for retired Floridians; and those entrepreneurs like me who try to do the “right thing” and have their lives ruined by fiduciaries that have enormous power by virtue of “other peoples’ money”; i.e., the citizens of Florida. On a personal note, I believe this may be a serious matter for Florida beyond money because when Liberty enters a U.S. District Court, they seem to do so with the implied imprimatur of Florida.

Respectfully Yours,

David Still

Cc Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer, Florida
Patricia A. “Trish” Conners, Esq., Associate Deputy Attorney General, Florida
Ms. Beverly Bailey, Florida Attorney General’s Office
Enclosure: Addendum of facts from admissions and the record in over 6,000 pdf documents.

____________________________________________________________________

Addendum to Letter to
The Honorable Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of Florida
Facts from Admissions and the Record, Endnotes, and over 6,000 documents
September 1, 2013

Contents

  1. Communications to/from Mr. Still and the SBA and Office of the District Attorney
  2. Persons, definitions, and business conditions at Regulus in the relevant time period
  3. Misleading indications of future financial performance and omitted enterprise forecasts
  4. Misleading indications of value and/or omitted enterprise valuations
  5. Undisclosed legal issues, “going concern” opinion, defaults, non-disclosure, and business risk
  6. Undisclosed charges of racial discrimination against Bennett, Long, Liberty, Regulus, et al
  7. Misleading statements in Liberty’s January 26, 2001, communication with SBA
  8. Undisclosed multiple and often conflicting roles G. Michael Stakias, Esq
  9. Over 6,000 documents from admissions and the record in a thumb drive

Enclosures to Post

David Still’s letter, factual brief,  and documents re Liberty Partners to AG Bondi dated September 1, 2013, with FexEx Successful Delivery Receipts

2013-09-01 David Still Letter, Brief, Documents re Liberty to AG Bondi with FexEx Successful Delivery Receipts

David Still’s letter to Governor Scott with copies to AG Bondi and CFO Atwater dated December 11, 2013, with USPS Successful Delivery Receipts

2013-12-11 David Still Letter to Governor Scott cc Bondi, Atwater with USPS Successful Delivery Receipts

David Still’s letter to AG Bondi copy to Governor Scott dated May 5, 2013, with FexEx Successful Delivery Receipts

2014-05-05 David Still Letter re Liberty to AG Bondi cc Governor Scott with FexEx Successful Delivery Receipts

David Still’s email to Executive Director Ash Williams dated May 19, 2013, with “Not Read” notice.

2014-05-19 Still-Email to Williams, MacKee re Tell the Truth About Liberty w Not Read Receipt

Endnotes

  1. Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer, Florida; Patricia A. “Trish” Conners, Esq., Associate Deputy Attorney General, Florida; and Ms. Beverly Bailey, Florida State Board of Administration. My Documents were also sent to the Co-Chiefs or the Asset Management Unit, Division of Enforcement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. I have “Successful Delivery Receipts” for all couriered Documents.
  2. Investment Management Agreement dated 1992
  3. Taxpayers [Florida taxpayers] are kept in the dark about many business decisions of the State Board of Administration, the agency that runs the nation’s fourth-largest public pension system for about 1 million current and former public employees, including teachers, police officers and state and county workers. It also manages a fund that pools money from hundreds of Florida towns, counties and school districts. No ordinary retiree can monitor dozens of private investments bought with $20 billion of public money. In other words, no ordinary retiree or taxpayer can easily find out what they invested in, whether funds are succeeding or who are lobbying for new private pension deals. What some of these private investments are worth won’t be publicly known until five to 10 years or more after the deal is made [or the deal is ended or never (author)]. Take Liberty Partners, a private partnership in which the state has plowed more than $2.5 billion over 18 years. As of October, the pension fund had gotten back $2.4 billion. Liberty received $180 million in fees. In most private equity deals, management fees are 1 percent to 2 percent of the annual investment. Liberty’s are 7 percent of what the state invested.” Freedberg, Sydney P., “Florida’s pension administrator touts transparency … with exceptions,” (Article) Tampa Bay Times, April 23, 2011
  4. Source: SBA
  5. Source: SBA document “2006-08-21 Lattera@SBA-Still w SBA paid fees to Liberty of $28 Million for Regulus Alone”
  6. This letter and addendum contain facts from admissions and the record and over 6,000 documents.
  7. Source document “1999-08-31 Liberty’s LBO Report to SBA 1 Month”
  8. Source document “2001-12-31 Liberty’s LBO Report to SBA 1 Month”
  9. Source document “2010-10-18 St Petersburg Times re fees Paid Liberty Partners (USDC)”, p6
  10. Source document “1992-09-01 SBA-Liberty Investment Management Agreements (IMA) w Amendments to 2005”
  11. See document ”2003-02-04 13 US District Court Trial Transcript Days 02 and 09 Bennett Annotated for Admissions (USDC),” p48
  12. See document ”2003-02-04 13 US District Court Trial Transcript Days 02 and 09 Bennett Annotated for Admissions (USDC),” p48
  13. At one point, Liberty could invest $1.8 billion of the SBA’s money. Liberty is required to file reports on its investments with the SBA. Liberty’s founder Peter Bennett (Bennett) personally signed the letters of transmittal with Liberty’s quarterly reports to the SBA.
  14. See document “2006-08-21 Lattera@SBA-Still w SBA paid fees to Liberty of $28 Million for Regulus Alone”
  15. See document “2006-08-21 Lattera@SBA-Still w SBA paid fees to Liberty of $28 Million for Regulus Alone”
  16. Source: Liberty Partners document “1996-06-20 Bennett@Liberty Initial Commitment Letter (USDC)”
  17. Bennett testified Regulus was not a typical kind of investment that Liberty’s made and was its first investment in a start-up/early stage company. See document ”2003-02-04 13 US District Court Trial Transcript Days 02 and 09 Bennett Annotated for Admissions (USDC),” p59
  18. Source document ”2003-02-04 13 US District Court Trial Transcript Days 02 and 09 Bennett Annotated for Admissions (USDC),” day 01. p12. and day 02. p74
  19. Source document “2008-06-13 3i Infotech Acquires Regulus $100 million”
  20. Source document “2009-06-23 Levine@Liberty-Treanor-Bower@SBA Still re Proceeds to Liberty from Sale of Regulus [Rec 2012]”
  21. After recapitalizing the Company with Regulus, I was a class B Member, designated class B member on the board managers, owner of class B, C, and D shares and, at different times, member of the compensation committee, president, chief executive officer, and chairman of the board.
  22. Source document “2000-04-11 Still-Bennett@Liberty Stand-Back Letter (USDC)”
  23. Source document “2000-04-19 Board Meeting Minutes”
  24. In 2000, I wrote to Liberty “The money for Regulus comes from a pension fund. As such, there are general rules, customs, statutes, etc. that require a higher duty for records that would be appropriate with companies that Dick has run – where he is the only owner or 90% equity, whatever. In my view, Mike [Stakias] and Dick [Long] manage this company like it is their own private company.
  25. In 2000, I wrote Bennett “At this point, I am unsure what else I can do to convince you that our investment in Regulus is in serious, serious trouble. Never-the-less, I am making one more attempt… believe management has purposefully “covered up” from the banks, in 1999 and 2000, certain inadequacies in the company’s financing and financial results.
  26. In 2000, I wrote Liberty “In my view, and at the peril of the company’s value, you and the board continue to ignore the legitimate issues that I bring forward.
  27. In 2000, I wrote Liberty “Paul [Huston], I am determined to have this compliance audit conducted. I believe that under the circumstances the board would be delinquent in its duties by not having it.
  28. Source documents “2002-06-30 Liberty’s Quarterly Report to SBA” and “2001-06-30 Liberty’s LBO Report to SBA”
  29. Source documents “2002-06-30 Liberty’s Quarterly Report to SBA” and “2002-07-15 Merglekamp-Long w 2002-03-11 Valuation+Forecast (to SBA) NP ML 112D97143163-01”
  30. Source document “2002-06-30 Liberty’s Quarterly Report to SBA”
  31. A Judge ruled my shares were canceled in mid-2002
  32. Source document”2000-09-21 Liberty-SBA Amendment Increases Investment Limit $150M to $250M (USDC)”
  33. Source document In January 2001, Bennett wrote to the SBA: “Regulus continues to make excellent progress with its initiatives to improve the profitability of the remittance processing businesses which it has acquired from Wells Fargo, Chase, Bank of America and others over its four years of operations.” The fact is that in 2001, Regulus lost another $25 million for five years of losses totaling $100 million.
  34. Source document “2001-12-31 Regulus Group LLC & RIS Combined 2001 Audited Financial Statements issued 2002-03-29”
  35. In 2000, I wrote Liberty “I will never knowingly put Liberty, partners of Liberty, Regulus, the SBA, or me at legal risk”.
  36. In 2000, I wrote to Regulus “I want to be very clear with you why I am asking you for this information. I believe the company “may” have committed bank and other fraud when its representative signed the Wells Fargo Bank and/or Bank of America Agreements, and borrowed funds from the State Board of Administration for the Wells Fargo deal and other drawdowns.
  37. Source document: “2000-07-27 Still-Long-Genkin@BR re 98-99, VioDef, Req4Info, Req4CompCert, PotFraud (USDC)”
  38. In 2000, I wrote Bennett “In my view, the Board’s lack of action on compliance with agreements will potentially dramatically reduce the value of my investment in Regulus, as well as the investments of others. Indeed, if I am right in my assertions, such lack of action is simply illegal. Why do you and the Board fail to act or even investigate? I am frankly shocked at the lack of concern and action by you and Shaun on this matter.
  39. Source document “2000-06-02 Still-Bennett@Liberty re Actions Put Company’s Value is in Peril, VioDef, Discl, EEOC (USDC)”
  40. Liberty never communicated its 2001 and 2002 forecasts to the SBA.
  41.  Source document “2002-06-30 Liberty’s Quarterly Report to SBA”[/Note] and its equity value was $208 million.41Liberty’s enterprise and equity values communicated with the SBA were $591 and $465 million higher, respectively than its testimony to the U.S. District Court.
  42. Merrill’s enterprise valuation was $540 and $772 million higher than Liberty’s written testimony to the U.S. District Court.
  43. $28 million does not include part of 2006, 2007 and 2008.
  44. Mr. Still does not know how the IRR was calculated.
  45. Any return with the denominator of $0 is infinite.
  46. Largely as a result of Liberty’s actions I spent or incurred millions of dollars of debt for legal fees and costs, was forced to file for bankruptcy, have been unable to get employment for years, live on $1,300 per month of social security, have no assets other than a used car, have no money, lost my family home to bank foreclosure, became separated from my wife of twenty seven years after I lost my home and was unable to support her, am unable to repay debt, have irreparably bad credit from write-offs, am managing residual medical issues, and am living in basement rooms in a new city unable to pay rent (accruing rent payable).
Share